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ABSTRACT 
Attempts to enhance individual and communal morality are as old as human communal living itself. 
But only recently have philosophers, bioethicists and scientists begun to seriously consider the 
possibilities and implications of employing technological interventions into the human body, 
especially the brain, in order to enhance traits and capabilities that underlie what we might term as 
moral reasoning, action and behavior. Some illicit drugs, prescription pharmaceuticals and non-
invasive brain stimulation techniques have been shown to have effects on diminishing or enhancing 
certain of our mental traits that constitute moral thinking, action and behavior in healthy adults. This 
hints at the possibility of targeted interventions that might predictably improve individual and 
communal morality and through it societal cooperation. The first part of the paper will delve into 
some of the conceptual issues connected with moral enhancement as part of the broader trend of 
cognitive enhancement and human enhancement in general. The second part will look at some 
experiments and interventions that support the plausibility of technologically enhancing moral 
reasoning and moral behavior. The third part will present some of the arguments that have been 
written both for and against moral enhancement, including whether we might in certain situations 
have a duty to morally enhance ourselves. The final part looks at some further dilemmas of whether 
we might already be enhancing ourselves morally through some commonly prescribed pharmaceutical 
drugs, and what a (further) “medicalization” of moral deficits might mean. 
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WHAT IS MORAL ENHANCEMENT 
Generally, human enhancement can be seen as the use of direct technological interventions 
into the human body with the goal of enhancing the average or normal capabilities of healthy 
adults. The aim of such interventions is to extend the healthy lifespan, improve physical 
capabilities, and enhance cognitive capacities, including mood, in short, to make us healthier, 
smarter, happier and longer lived [1, 2]. Much of the discourse on human enhancement has so 
far revolved around cognitive enhancement, technological interventions to improve, for 
example, concentration, memory, learning, problem solving, decision-making, etc. in healthy 
adults. A big part of the reason for this is that in contrast to many other potential human 
enhancement technologies, which are still in the early R&D phase or purely theoretical, 
certain prescription pharmaceuticals, illicit drugs, dietary supplements and non-invasive brain 
stimulation devices, such as transcranial magnetic stimulation and transcranial current 
stimulation devices [3, 4], are already available in the healthcare, consumer or illicit markets 
and are being used by self-experimenters, certain professional groups, and students among 
others [5, 6]. Only recently have some philosophers and bioethicists begun a discussion on 
the possibility of using such technological means in order to enhance what we might term 
morality, that is, improving moral reasoning, action and behavior [7, 8]. 
While we might view the whole history of human communal living as attempts to promote, 
enhance and enforce morality in order to benefit the group or community, such attempts were 
mostly restricted to community enforcement through education and sanctions, moral codes 
and societal mores.  
In parallel, and at least for the entire history of human civilization, we can also observe many 
attempts to enhance individual moral traits by pursuing personal quests for enlightenment and 
liberation through meditation, fasting, prayer and other ascetic practices, some of which have 
grown into sociocultural and religious movements and communities such as the various 
strands of Buddhism, the Jainism community and various New Age movements and 
communities. While both of these endeavors at least nominally pursue a common goal, there 
can be many different ways of interpreting what is moral, and while there are at least some 
human moral universals that span times and cultures, there is also much variation and change 
in regard to what is deemed moral and immoral, and to what extent the wellbeing of the 
individual can be sacrificed for the “good” of the community. 
The Anthropocene age, with its increasing understanding of the structure and function of the 
biological systems that make up the human body, as well as a growing array of tools that can 
influence or even enhance its various capabilities and functions, now offers the possibility of 
using technological interventions to enhance the moral capabilities of healthy individuals 
who do not fall into any abnormal psychological category.  
It is certainly no easy task trying to define what the moral traits and capabilities that we need 
to enhance in order to enhance morality are. Moral philosophy and psychology as well as 
cognitive science and neuroscience have long struggled to discover and map the psychological 
traits and the underlying neurophysiological systems that constitute moral reasoning and 
moral behavior. While considerable progress has been made in this regard, we are still far 
from knowing all the details and intricacies of the mental processes that lead to the execution 
of a moral action, let alone of the underlying biological systems and processes involved. 
Morally enhancing an individual would mean increasing the probability that they will behave 
the “right” way in a certain situation and reducing the chances that they will behave the 
“wrong” way in the same situation. Although the notion of right and wrong may seem vague 
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and may differ across societies and cultures (viewing morality as a culturally relative 
construct), there do exist universal tendencies, which have been observed by scientists in 
various fields. The philosopher Immanuel Kant spoke of “the moral law within”, various 
anthropologists have found moral sentiments to be one of these human universals [9], and 
there are also neurobiological components suggesting we may have an innate sense of 
morality [10]. As with language, it is suggested that we have an evolved capacity to learn 
moral systems, which have proved useful in navigating complex social environments, thus 
increasing the chances of our survival and reproductive fitness. However, this system has not 
been subject to further evolution since the time we were living in small communities, and 
may need to be adapted or updated by technological enhancement means in order to adapt our 
moral capabilities to the demands of living in complex societies and a global, interconnected 
and interdependent community, enabled and dependent on all the technological 
advancements that were not present in the past. Our sphere of moral care may be expanding, 
but this may not be occurring at a rate proportional with the rapidly growing power such 
advancements are putting into the hands of small groups and individuals. 
In order to better understand what we might mean by moral enhancement, we could start off 
with a list of traits that we associate with moral persons, such as strength of character, self-
control, kindness, compassion, tolerance, altruism and others. Still, many of these are context 
dependent in the sense that their outcomes could result in the improved wellbeing or in the 
increased suffering of others. In order to deem something moral, we must usually consider it 
in its wider, specific sociocultural context, taking into account its immediate and also long-
term consequences. 
The enhancement of one trait involved in moral reasoning and action, for example 
self-control, could result in the diminishment of another, for example risk taking, and thus 
lead to a reduced willingness to take risks to help others. 
Ultimately, we are talking about an interconnection between our evolutionary conditioned 
responses to the environment and the behavior of other members of our species, and 
culturally produced and contextually specific norms and practices. 
Although specific types of morality are created, transferred and transformed in interpersonal 
relationships within a community or society in complex feedback loops involving our 
evolved instincts and emotions, they still remain encoded in the specific brain structures of 
individuals. And possessing the technological tools that can influence these neurological 
structures, hints at the real possibility of manipulating these structures and through them the 
mental mechanisms underlying moral thinking and action. 
THE MEANS OF MORAL ENHANCEMENT 
While defining moral enhancement remains elusive, we can recognize traits and tendencies 
that are connected with moral reasoning, action and behavior and interventions that produce 
changes in those traits and outcomes. As we have hinted, throughout history individuals, 
communities and cultures have developed a vast array of tools that are intended to enhance 
the morality of its members and through it the survival and functioning of the communities. 
In recent times, various experiments have shown that non-invasive brain stimulation devices, 
prescription pharmaceuticals, illicit drugs, and dietary supplements can influence the various 
traits and mechanisms involved in moral thinking and action. 
Experiments with transcranial magnetic stimulation have for example shown effects on moral 
reasoning, for example by reducing the influence of beliefs on the moral judgment of actions 
or the compliance with socially constituted sanctions [11, 12]. The use of transcranial current 
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stimulation for example reduced the tendency to punish unfair behavior [13]. Further 
experiments have investigated the effects of antidepressants, hormones, blood-pressure 
medication and illicit drugs. An increased level of serotonin through the use of SSRI 
antidepressants in healthy people could enhance resistance to violent actions that harm other 
people and thus influence moral judgment and moral actions [14]. The use of oxytocin, the 
bonding hormone, has had an impact on the moral behavior of healthy adults, but differently 
for men and for women. Women behaved in a more altruistic manner, while men behaved 
more selfishly [15]. Taking propranolol for high blood pressure reduced the implicit racial 
bias in healthy people performing jury duty [16]. The use of MDMA or “ecstasy” 
strengthened the recognition of emotions, emotional empathy and prosocial behavior in 
healthy volunteers, but again differently in women and in men [17]. Using theanine, the 
amino acid found in tea and responsible for calming effects on the nervous system, might 
make people less prone to impulsive decisions and reactions made in anger. 
There is also considerable overlap of the techniques for moral enhancement with the other 
categories of human enhancement, especially cognitive enhancement and the interventions 
that have been employed to enhance various cognitive abilities in that context [3]. Being 
better able to concentrate, recall facts, and make quality decisions makes us more capable of 
good moral reasoning. Taking a cognitive stimulant that enhances motivation and self-control 
could give us the motivation and self-restraint to perform moral actions of which we might 
not be capable otherwise. 
Further, our current moods and perceptions of the world and of ourselves, if positive, 
generally make us more tolerant, forgiving, loving, helpful and kind. Feeling like we are 
having a “pretty good day” can thus make us more moral than if we feel like we are having a 
bad day. In that sense, technological mood enhancement might also be seen as contributing to 
moral enhancement. 
We should acknowledge that both our internal states and our surrounding environment 
strongly influence our capacity to think and to behave morally. Experiments in psychology, 
such as those performed by Milgram and Zimbardo, have shown that we have a strong 
tendency towards group and social conformity when we perceive a strong consensus, but 
again, strengthening our internal moral capabilities might make us better able to perform 
moral actions that might go against the prevailing behavior of the community. Whether such 
actions would be judged as moral or immoral of course depends on the observer and the 
sociocultural context. But we might at least argue that enhancing the traits that promote 
loving kindness would be less likely to result in moral actions which nevertheless hurt the 
wellbeing of others. 
Finally, as we have noted before, enhancing only one capability or trait could lead to the 
diminishment of others, which are equally important in performing moral reasoning and 
actions. In this regard, it would be necessary to engage in an endeavor that would enhance 
and develop all virtues of one’s character in a balanced manner in order to produce a 
well-rounded “virtuous person”. 
To avoid the problematic consequences of enhancing one trait at the expense of diminishing 
another, Hughes [18] suggests a holistic approach of modulating and balancing virtues. This 
can be imagined and represented as the creation of a control panel for moral sentiment and 
cognition with dials or sliders representing neurological traits that need to be tuned. These 
“sliders” would be “tuned” through the application of enhancement technologies that regulate 
specific neurological traits to the desired degree. As for the traits themselves, he puts forward 
a minimal model, based on previous models, which empirically structure the concepts of 
virtues in correspondence to their underlying neurological mechanisms. These consist of four 
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categories: self-control (sophrosyne1, restraint, conscientiousness, temperance), niceness 
(agreeableness, extraversion, empathy, fairness), intelligence (phronesis2, open-mindedness, 
curiosity, love of learning, prudence), and positivity ((lack of) neuroticism, emotional 
self-regulation, positivity, bravery, humor). An example of this type of balancing would be 
modulating the traits of self-control, empathy and mindfulness in conjunction with enhancing 
intelligence, since too much deliberation (arising from the trait of intelligence) can have a 
negative effect on decision-making [19]. 
So as with most endeavors, it might be prudent to take a more comprehensive, holistic 
approach to moral enhancement. In this way, using drugs or non-invasive brain stimulation 
should not be seen as a replacement, but possibly as a complementary addition to more 
traditional means of enhancing morality, such as character building, virtue development, 
education, meditation, etc. Another, perhaps less controversial venue of technologies that 
could enhance our moral behavior, would be the use of apps or trackers that would remind us, 
prompt us and warn us whenever we are to engage in moral behavior, to take a certain, 
predefined action. We might view these as external morality algorithms, as outsourced moral 
mechanisms, or as a high-tech version of the “What Would Jesus Do” armbands popular as 
morality reminders in the US. 
THE PERMISSIBILITY AND DUTIFULNESS OF MORAL ENHANCEMENT 
While the experiments and the technological means of enhancing some aspects and traits that 
influence moral reasoning and behavior described above represent only the first tentative 
generation of technological interventions for moral enhancement, they do raise the question 
of whether such interventions should be socially permissible, and further, whether in specific 
situations we might actually have a duty to enhance ourselves morally by technological means. 
For example, Savulescu and Sandberg [7] have argued that couples who are freely and 
rationally committed to a relationship should be free to pursue the strengthening of this 
relationship by employing various means, including pharmacological substances that enhance 
feelings of love and bonding, which would lead to greater emotional commitment, 
satisfaction and fidelity, if they so choose. They have further extended this argument that 
individuals in specific situations or circumstances should not only be permitted to engage in 
moral enhancement, but might actually have a duty to do so (a moral duty, not a legal 
obligation) [20]. In this regard they argue that especially parents with children might have a 
duty to try and make their marriage work, as long as there are reasonable grounds for both 
parties to do so, including using technological means, which could be added to the category 
of marriage therapy. 
If we pursue such an argument further, we might ask ourselves whether people in certain 
professions or in positions of responsibility might have a similar duty to morally enhance 
themselves, including through technological means. Would it make sense to say that 
members of a jury should consider it to be their duty to use enhancements in order to deliver 
a more objective verdict? Would a judge have a duty to be morally enhanced in order to pass 
a more rational and dispassionate verdict? Here we should also keep in mind whether we 
want a verdict that is compassionate and loving kind, or one that is dispassionate and 
objective, or more precisely what the balance between the two extremes should be? What 
about politicians? CEOs of companies? Would we want them to be morally enhanced? 
Further arguments for moral enhancement have been made regarding issues that pertain to the 
Great Societal Challenges, such as climate change, dwindling resources in terms of food and 
water, environmental degradation, etc., as well as the issues of global justice and solidarity. 
Some authors [21] have proposed that (voluntarily) taking a pharmacological substance that 
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made one sick when ingesting meat could be seen as a sort of moral enhancement (or moral 
therapy, depending on one's viewpoint) that would address the discrepancy between a 
person's rational, ethical commitment to being a vegetarian and feeling a strong, innate 
craving for animal meat. Other intervention could pertain to increasing our capability to feel 
moral sympathy, compassion towards the plight of larger numbers of people in distant lands. 
From studies in cognitive science and psychology it is well known that we are innately 
capable of feeling great emotional support and sympathy for people who are part of our 
community and with whom we have close personal ties and relationships (with our “kith and 
kin”), but not with people whom we know only in the abstract, that is, people in war-torn 
countries, the world's poorest masses, etc, even thought the numbers of suffering individuals 
in the two groups can be grossly disproportional. 
Ultimately, Persson and Savulescu have also argued that as our technological capabilities, 
including other forms of human enhancement such as cognitive enhancement, grow, it will be 
necessary for humans to enhance themselves morally through technological means, as the 
destructive power that is available to an individual person through technological development 
increases rapidly [22]. 
On the other hand, if we were to enhance ourselves in order to be less prone to violence, 
would this affect our capability for self-defense, or our capacity to rise up and struggle 
against an unjust authority and society? Would an increased capacity for empathy make us 
insufficiently rational and egotistical to be able to normally function in the world, or would 
we be emotionally compelled to give away all our possessions to people who are in greater 
need than we are? 
Some further dilemmas pertain to the morals specific for temporally different sociocultural 
epochs. For example, until the quite recent past, it was considered widely morally acceptable 
(and legally permissible) to hold specific groups or ethnicities of people in slavery, to allow 
women only a very limited set of freedoms and rights, and to hold specific sociocultural or 
intimate practices as morally objectionable (and even legally sanctionable). For example, the 
freedom of being homosexual is still a widely contested issue. Then there is the question of 
different values in different political regimes. We can imagine that most of the liberal 
democracies would promote a very different set of values and traits (in the moral sense) than 
would secular strongly authoritarian countries, such as North Korea, or extreme theocracies, 
such as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Here it might be prudent to emphasize that 
moral enhancement should not go in the direction of promoting a specific temporally and 
culturally too narrow or closed moral belief system, but should instead enhance a (preferably 
balanced) set of capacities that provide the individual with the cognitive and affective 
apparatus to be able to judge things in a more open and empathic manner, while promoting 
one's sense of rationality and critical decision-making. In this regard, at least in a normative 
sense, we would propose following an eudaeimonic3 approach as advocated by Hughes [23]. 
Still, as most of the enhancement possibilities that we have mentioned are still only very early 
and tentative indications, there is a need for much more research and experimentation before 
we can ascertain, in an empirical sense, whether it is more likely specific interventions will 
promote narrow, specific moralities, or an overall, well balanced individual in the sense of an 
virtue ethics approach. 
INSTEAD OF A CONCLUSION 
As we have noted, many of the technological interventions that influence mental systems and 
capacities connected to moral thinking and action, are prescription pharmaceuticals, which 
means that many patients across the world are already using them and might be subject to 
their morality enhancing side effects [23]. 
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Finally, all this raises the question if the examples described above represent the actual 
enhancement of moral capabilities in average healthy people or "only" the treatment of below 
average or diminished capacities in people with diseases, injuries or disabilities, or 
neuropsychological structures that could be labeled as psychopathic or sociopathic. This leads 
us to the question of whether even less extreme versions of antisocial behavior might in the 
future become categorized as illnesses or malfunctions that need to be treated in a medical 
context. This raises wide-ranging implications for the concepts of personal responsibility and 
free will, which have already been opened by modern neuroscientific research and brain 
imaging, for example in the fields of insurance and law, as well as societal engagement. 
And whenever the debate extends beyond what rational individuals should be permitted to do 
if they so choose in pursuit of their desires and goals as long as they do not harm others, we 
should be careful of discourses that turn to what might be seen as mandatory biomedical 
treatment of individuals who are “morally deficient”, especially if that morality is defined in 
terms of narrow societal norms and historically bound mores. 
REMARKS 
1An ancient Greek concept of an ideal of excellence of character and soundness of mind, in 
1some interpretations considered the opposite pole of hubris [24]. 
2An ancient Greek concept pertaining to a type of wisdom relevant to practical things, 
2requiring an ability to discern how or why to act virtuously and encourage practical virtue, 
2excellence of character. Translated as practical wisdom and interpreted by some authors as 
2equivalent to mindfulness [25]. 
3Used in the sense of promoting human or personal flourishing, derived from an overall and 
3balanced development of various capacities and/or virtues. 
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